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I. INTRODUCTION 
The disproportionate incarceration of minorities is one of the Amer-
ican criminal justice system’s most established problems. In spite of a 
societal backdrop in which descriptive claims of a “post-racial” America 
prosper, the problematic racial dynamics of criminal justice persist. The 
numbers are stark and clear: one out of every twenty-nine black adult 
women and men are currently incarcerated compared with only one out 
of every 194 whites.1 But less clear are the causes of these disparities. 
For decades, scholars have struggled to understand why America prose-
cutes and incarcerates minorities at such massive rates. Perspectives on 
this troubling issue cover an incredibly wide range of themes, spanning 
from racist discussions of “biological differences” to thoughtful consid-
erations of structural racism. A scientific revolution, however, has gener-
ated new interest with regard to how upstanding people—including judg-
es, jurors, lawyers, and police—may discriminate without intending to do 
so. This implicit bias revolution has created new opportunities to empiri-
cally investigate how actors within the legal system can perpetuate dis-
crimination in ways that have been—until now—almost impossible to 
detect. 
The topic of implicit racial bias in the legal system is extraordinari-
ly broad, and scholars are beginning to consider how it might illuminate 
inequality across a range of legal domains.2 In the criminal law setting, in 
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 1. JENIFER WARREN, THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
PROJECT, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 34 tbl.A-6 (2008), http://www.pew 
centeronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf (aggregat-
ing numbers for all fifty states). For younger adults, the numbers are similarly startling. See id. One 
out of every nine black males between ages twenty and thirty-four are incarcerated. Id. 
 2. See generally IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. 
Smith eds., forthcoming 2012) (considering implicit racial bias across fourteen different legal do-
mains). 
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particular, there has been noticeable progress. Recent empirical projects 
have begun the pursuit of assessing how implicit racial bias likely affects 
police, judicial, and juror decision-making.3 But scholars have yet to 
conduct an in-depth examination of how implicit bias might affect one of 
the most noteworthy parts of the criminal justice system—prosecutorial 
discretion—and no empirical projects focused on implicit bias have 
gained access to prosecutors as study participants. The idea that prosecu-
tors might be partially responsible for propagating inequality in the crim-
inal justice system is far from new.4 Until now, however, it has been dif-
ficult to explain in detail why prosecutors—the vast majority of whom 
would never intend to hold double-standards based on race—might none-
theless be unwitting propagators of bias. 
From the arrest of a suspect to the sentencing of a defendant, con-
sider the range of discretion-based decisions that prosecutors must make 
on a daily basis: Should an arrested citizen be charged with a crime? At 
what level should bail be recommended? Should bail be opposed? What 
crime or crimes will be charged? Should charges be dropped? Should a 
                                                            
 3. See Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the 
Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1006–09 (2007); Justin D. Levinson, 
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 
350 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality]; Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by 
Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 
187–89 (2010) [hereinafter Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et 
al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1195, 1195–96 
(2009). 
 4. See Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the 
Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2083, 2094–106 (2004) (considering the extreme deference given to prosecutors); 
Rory K. Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity 
Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter of Timothy McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591, 1599–600 
(2004) (addressing “unconscious race empathy” that white prosecutors may have with white defend-
ants or white victims); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective: Race of the 
Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1819 (1998) (alluding to unconscious biases pro-
duced due to similarities between prosecutors and victims); Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent nor Impact: A 
Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 140–41 (2003) (proposing that it “[i]s likely that unconscious racism 
influences a prosecutor even more than it affects others”); Lucy Adams, Comment, Death by Discre-
tion: Who Decides Who Lives and Dies in the United States of America?, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 381, 
389–90 (2005) (“[A] white prosecutor may—consciously or subconsciously—perceive a crime to be 
more ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman’ if it is alleged to have been committed 
against a white victim . . . .” (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1994) (footnote omitted))). 
We do not claim that implicit racial bias accounts for all of the racial discrepancies in the criminal 
justice system. Structural racism, for example, may explain some of the disparity. In addition, for 
some types of crime, differences in offense rates also may help explain part of the variance. See 
Homicide Trends in the U.S., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/homi 
cide/race.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2012) (indicating that black Americans represent 52% of the 
known homicide offenders between 1976 and 2005). It should be noted, however, that both structur-
al racism and implicit bias could account for some or even all of the disproportionality in arrest rates. 
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plea bargain be offered or negotiated? Which prosecuting attorney will 
prosecute which alleged crime? What will the trial strategy be? Will mi-
nority jurors be challenged for cause or with peremptory challenges? 
What sentence will be recommended? 
This range of discretion offers a starting point with which to inves-
tigate how implicit bias might infect the prosecutorial process. Following 
a long line of scholarship examining the causes of racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system,5 this Article argues that implicit racial attitudes 
and stereotypes skew prosecutorial decisions in a range of racially biased 
ways. 
The Article is organized as follows: Part II provides an introduction 
to implicit bias research, orienting readers to the important aspects of 
implicit bias most relevant to prosecutorial discretion. Part III begins the 
examination of implicit bias in the daily decisions of prosecutors. The 
Part presents key prosecutorial discretion points and specifically con-
nects each of them to implicit bias. Part IV recognizes that, despite com-
pelling proof of implicit bias in a range of domains, there is no direct 
empirical proof of implicit bias in prosecutorial decision-making. It thus 
calls for an implicit bias research agenda designed to further examine 
how and when implicit bias affects prosecutorial decision-making, in-
cluding studies designed to test ways of reducing the harms of these bi-
ases. It then begins a necessarily early look at potential remedies for the 
harms associated with implicit bias in prosecutorial discretion. 
II. IMPLICIT BIAS AND ITS RELEVANCE TO PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
Implicit racial bias describes the cognitive processes whereby, de-
spite even the best intentions, people automatically classify information 
in racially biased ways. Since the late 1990s, a vast amount of research 
on implicit bias has demonstrated that a majority of Americans, for ex-
ample, harbor negative implicit attitudes toward blacks and other socially 
disadvantaged groups, associate women with family and men with the 
workplace, associate Asian-Americans with foreigners, and more.6 Fur-
                                                            
 5. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); 
MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA (2011); James Foreman, 
Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2012); Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in 
the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010). 
 6. See Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American = White?, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 447, 447–48 (2005); Thierry Devos & Debbie S. Ma, Is Kate Winslet More American 
Than Lucy Liu? The Impact of Construal Processes on the Implicit Ascription of a National Identity, 
47 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 191–92 (2008); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual 
Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998); Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs 
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thermore, researchers have found repeatedly that people’s implicit biases 
often defy their awareness and self-reported egalitarian values. In this 
Part, we begin by summarizing research on implicit racial bias general-
ly,7 and then provide specific examples of studies that facilitate our con-
sideration of whether prosecutors may make decisions in biased ways. 
Because we believe that prosecutors’ implicit biases manifest in a series 
of related decisions in which their perceptions of the defendants’ danger-
ousness are paramount (ranging from the decision to charge to sentenc-
ing recommendations), we consider implicit bias studies that show that 
people automatically classify members of certain groups (particularly 
African-Americans) as dangerous, aggressive, and hostile. We also con-
sider studies that show that when racial stereotypes such as these are ac-
tive, people unintentionally make decisions in biased ways. These studies 
will set the stage for a step-by-step consideration of the points in time at 
which prosecutors might be unwittingly influenced by implicit bias. 
A. Priming: The Automatic Activation of Stereotype Networks 
“Priming” is a cognitive phenomenon that reveals how exposing 
people to photos, symbolic representations, or members of stereotyped 
groups activates a vast network of stereotypes about that group. Psy-
chologists define priming as “the incidental activation of knowledge 
structures, such as trait concepts and stereotypes, by the current situa-
tional context.”8 In the context of prosecutorial decision-making, priming 
might explain how, even with only minimal contact with an arrestee 
(such as seeing the arrestee’s name, racial or ethnic classification, or 
photograph), racial stereotypes can be immediately and automatically 
activated in the mind of a prosecutor, without the prosecutor’s aware-
ness. 
Racial and ethnic stereotypes can be primed easily. A study by 
Daniel Gilbert and Gregory Hixon demonstrated that simply seeing a 
person from a stereotyped group can activate stereotypes related to that 
                                                                                                                                     
from a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 101–02 (2002) (reporting results from 
600,000 IATs on a popular online website). Much of this Part’s description of implicit bias is based 
on Justin D. Levinson, SuperBias: The Collision of Behavioral Economics and Implicit Social Cog-
nition, AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). Some of the descriptions of implicit bias, including 
study summaries and footnotes, are reproduced sometimes verbatim from that article. 
 7. Our goal is to provide a focused discussion of implicit racial bias as it relates to prosecutori-
al discretion. We therefore do not provide a full review of implicit bias scholarship. Other articles 
have provided broader reviews of implicit bias more generally. See generally IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 
ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 2; Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 
(2005); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427 
(2007); Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 3. 
 8. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and 
Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 230 (1996). 
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group. Participants in the study were asked to complete a videotaped 
word fragment task presented by a research assistant holding cue cards.9 
Half of the participants watched a video featuring an Asian research as-
sistant, and half watched a video featuring a Caucasian research assis-
tant.10 In each condition, the research assistant held the cards containing 
fragments that could be completed with either neutral words or with 
words stereotypic of Asians.11 For each fragment, participants completed 
as many words as possible in fifteen seconds. The researchers found that 
simply seeing an Asian research assistant activated participants’ ethnic 
stereotypes.12 Participants who saw an Asian research assistant complet-
ed more stereotype-consistent words than participants who saw a Cauca-
sian assistant.13 This study shows how easily racial or ethnic stereotypes 
can be activated; simply seeing a person from a certain group can awak-
en harmful stereotypes. 
Studies show that priming specifically activates the stereotype of 
the dangerous black male. Researchers Laurie Rudman and Matthew 
Lee, for example, primed participants by playing either pop music or rap 
music.14 They hypothesized first that simply hearing rap music would 
activate participants’ racial stereotypes, and second that these primed 
stereotypes would cause people to make more negative judgments about 
a black person.15 The results of the study confirmed these predictions. 
Participants who listened to the rap music not only had their stereotypes 
activated but also rated a black person’s behavior as less intelligent and 
more hostile than participants who listed to popular music.16 It should be 
noted that asking participants about their own prejudices did not predict 
their judgments of the black person—a finding that supports the theory 
that stereotypes can affect decision-making even absent a person’s en-
dorsement or awareness.17 
                                                            
 9. Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application 
of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 510 (1991). As Gilbert and Hixon 
point out, “Stereotypes are forms of information and, as such, are thought to be stored in memory in 
a dormant state until they are activated for use.” Id. at 511. 
 10. Id. at 512. 
 11. For example, participants saw the fragments: “RI_E,” “POLI_E,” “S_ORT,” and “S_Y.” 
Id. at 510. 
 12. Id. at 513–14. 
 13. For example, they wrote: RICE, POLITE, SHORT, and SHY. Id. 
 14. Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to 
Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133, 136–39 (2002). 
On average, participants listened to the music for thirteen minutes. Id. at 136. Participants were led 
to believe that they were participating in a marketing study. Id. at 135. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 139. This result was compared to participants who read about and rated a white per-
son. Id. at 136. 
 17. Id. at 145. 
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Other researchers have shown how even subliminal priming tech-
niques can activate a range of negative stereotypes about African-
Americans. In one of the most well-known studies of subliminal priming 
and race, Patricia Devine showed participants rapidly flashing words, 
including stereotypes, that were associated with African-Americans, in-
cluding “Blacks,” “Harlem,” “poor,” and “athletic.”18 Participants then 
were asked to read a story about a person engaging in hostile behaviors 
that were designed to be somewhat ambiguous, such as demanding mon-
ey back from a store clerk, and asked to make judgments about the per-
son engaging in these behaviors. The results of the study confirmed the 
dangers of priming racial stereotypes. Participants who were primed with 
more of the African-American stereotyped words judged the actor’s am-
biguous behavior as more hostile than participants who were primed with 
fewer of the stereotyped words. Devine concluded, “[T]he automatic ac-
tivation of the racial stereotype affects the encoding and interpretation of 
ambiguously hostile behaviors for both high- and low-prejudice sub-
jects.”19 
Stereotypes can thus be activated by seeing a member of a stereo-
typed group, by hearing a certain type of music, or by being exposed to 
stereotype-consistent words. In the trial context, studies related to prim-
ing have found that even simply showing mock jurors a photograph of a 
dark-skinned suspect can activate harmful racial stereotypes and affect 
decision-making.20 Justin Levinson and Danielle Young, for example, 
showed mock juror participants a series of photographs of a crime scene, 
including one security camera photo that showed a masked suspect rob-
bing the store.21 In the photo, the suspect, who was holding a gun, was 
dressed such that the only racially identifying information was the skin 
of his forearm. Half of the participants saw the photo showing the sus-
pect with dark skin, and the other half of the participants saw a photo of 
the suspect with lighter skin. Despite the obvious legal irrelevance of the 
suspect’s skin color to the evidence, Levinson and Young found that the 
skin tone of the perpetrator in the photo affected the way participants 
                                                            
 18. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Compo-
nents, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 9, 10 (1989). 
 19. Id. at 11. 
 20. See Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit 
Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 310 (2010); see also 
Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in Juries: How “Legal Prim-
ing” Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059, 1059–62 (2005) (finding 
that simply informing study participants that they were jurors in a criminal trial caused them to make 
harsher behavioral and mental state attributions of out-group members). 
 21. Levinson & Young, supra note 20, at 337. 
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judged trial evidence and rated the defendant’s guilt on a guilty/not-
guilty scale.22 
More specifically, mock jurors who saw the darker-skinned perpe-
trator found the same ambiguous evidence as more likely to indicate 
guilt, compared to mock jurors who saw the photo of the lighter-skinned 
perpetrator. Another study by Levinson found that simply changing the 
name and race of a suspect caused participants to remember case-
relevant information in racially biased ways.23 That is, participants who 
read about an African-American participant in a fight were more likely to 
remember that person’s aggressive actions than those who read about a 
white fight participant. Furthermore, in some instances participants even 
“misremembered” certain facts—falsely recalling aggressive things the 
perpetrator had actually not done—in racially biased ways.24 These stud-
ies show how simple situational cues, such as even brief exposure to ra-
cial information, can activate a vast network of racial stereotypes and 
affect decision-making in concerning ways. It would be expected, then, 
that when prosecutors work on cases involving members of stereotyped 
groups, stereotypes regarding these group members are automatically 
activated. 
B. The Implicit Association Test 
In addition to the obvious relevance of research on priming to pros-
ecutorial discretion, other research in the field of implicit social cogni-
tion helps illustrate how implicit biases might operate to affect prosecu-
tors’ decisions. The development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), 
for example, revolutionized the way the world looked at and understood 
implicit bias.25 Perhaps because its Web accessibility allows people to 
test (and attempt to overcome) their biases first hand, the IAT has served 
as a compelling and sometimes controversial symbol of implicit bias.26 In 
the IAT, 
                                                            
 22. Id. 
 23. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 3, at 350. 
 24. Id. at 400–01. 
 25. Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF 
REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 123 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds., 
2001); Greenwald et al., supra note 6, at 1464. 
 26. Several legal scholars have debated the best uses of the IAT, focusing on such issues as the 
meaning of reaction times as well as the question of whether IAT scores can predict behavior, 
known as predictive validity. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 479 (2007); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal 
Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to Situationist Insights, 57 EMORY L.J. 1087, 
1130–31 (2008); Lane et al., supra note 7, at 430; Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidis-
crimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1028, 1032–33 (2006); 
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Participants sit at a computer and are asked to pair an attitude object 
(for example, black or white, man or woman, fat or thin) with either 
an evaluative dimension (for example, good or bad) or an attribute 
dimension (for example, home or career, science or arts) by press-
ing a response key as quickly as they can. For instance, in one task, 
participants are told to quickly pair pictures of African American 
faces with positive words from the evaluative dimension. In a se-
cond task, participants are obliged to pair African American faces 
with negative words. The difference in the speed at which the par-
ticipants can perform the two tasks is interpreted as the strength of 
the attitude (or, in the case of attributes, the strength of the stereo-
type). For example, if participants perform the first task faster than 
the second task, they are showing implicitly positive attitudes to-
ward blacks. Similarly, if they are faster to perform tasks that oblige 
categorizing women with home than tasks that oblige categorizing 
women with career, they are showing implicit sex stereotyping.27 
Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald explain why the speed 
of association is important: “When highly associated targets and attrib-
utes share the same response key, participants tend to classify them 
quickly and easily, whereas when weakly associated targets and attrib-
utes share the same response key, participants tend to classify them more 
slowly and with greater difficulty.”28 Laurie Rudman and Richard Ash-
more similarly describe the IAT’s methodology as relying on “well-
practiced associations between objects and attributes.”29 
Researchers who employ the IAT have found that the majority of 
tested Americans harbor negative implicit attitudes and stereotypes to-
ward blacks, dark-skinned people, the elderly, and overweight people, 
among others.30 For example, with regard to race, people consistently 
implicitly associate black with negative attitudes such as bad and un-
pleasant, and with negative stereotypes such as aggressive and lazy.31 
                                                                                                                                     
Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
737, 737 (2009). 
 27. Justin D. Levinson et al., Implicit Racial Bias: A Social Science Overview, in IMPLICIT 
RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 2, at 9, 16–17 [hereinafter Levinson et al., Social Sci-
ence Overview]. 
 28. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: 
Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803 (2001). 
 29. Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association 
Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 359 (2007). 
 30. Nosek et al., supra note 6, at 101. 
 31. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 29, at 361. 
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With regard to gender, for example, Americans tend to associate men 
with career and women with home.32 
To legal scholars, the IAT has become a symbol of implicit bias.33 
There are two primary reasons for the compelling nature of the measure. 
First, research has shown consistently that people’s implicit biases fre-
quently diverge from their self-reported attitudes, a phenomenon known 
as dissociation.34 Thus, people who view themselves as having favorable 
attitudes toward certain groups may be surprised to learn that this explicit 
favorability is not reflected in their own implicit cognitions. This fact 
would likely be relevant in the context of prosecutors, as we would pre-
dict that most prosecutors report their racial attitudes to be egalitarian. 
Second, the IAT’s popularity among scholars as a symbol of ine-
quality may be traced to its success in predicting the way people make 
decisions. That is, the simple methodology of the IAT has shown how 
implicit bias leads to important real-world consequences, ranging from 
doctors’ medical treatment decisions to human resource officers’ deci-
sions on whether to offer an interview to a job candidate.35 In the case of 
prosecutors, we are primarily interested in whether prosecutors’ implicit 
                                                            
 32. See Nosek et al., supra note 6, at 101; see also Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Im-
plicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 1 
(2010) (finding that law students display this particular implicit bias as well as an implicit associa-
tion between men and judges, and women and paralegals). 
 33. Numerous scholars have discussed implicit racial bias and the IAT. See, e.g., Richard Del-
gado & Jean Stefancic, Four Observations About Hate Speech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 365–
66 (2009) (suggesting that hate speech may lead to implicit bias); Alex Geisinger, Rethinking Profil-
ing: A Cognitive Model of Bias and Its Legal Implications, 86 OR. L. REV. 657, 658 (2007) (claim-
ing that racial profiling relies on cognitive processes that harbor implicit biases); Tristin K. Green & 
Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
1435, 1445–54 (2008) (considering the relational aspects of implicit bias in the workplace); Jonathan 
Kahn, Race, Genes, and Justice: A Call to Reform the Presentation of Forensic DNA Evidence in 
Criminal Trials, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 325, 373 (2008) (discussing the results of IATs in the context of 
forensic DNA evidence); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 479 
(2008) (discussing implicit bias in the context of sexual orientation bias); Michael B. Mushlin & 
Naomi Roslyn Galtz, Getting Real About Race and Prisoner Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27, 41–
46 (2009) (discussing implicit bias in the context of prisoners’ rights); Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Dis-
crimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 74–77 (2009) (predicting that implicit bias leads to housing dis-
crimination against illegal immigrants); Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, Michelle 
Obama: A Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination through the Lens of Title VII, 
20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 19–34 (2009) (considering race- and gender-based implicit bias in 
politics and in the workplace); Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (And 
What Can Be Done About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 507 (2007) (noting that implicit bias 
may affect housing rentals more than employment decisions). 
 34. See Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Re-
search: Their Meanings and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 303 (2003); Kang, supra note 7, at 
1513; see also Laurie A. Rudman, Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: The Nature, 
Causes, and Consequences of Implicit Bias, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 129, 133 (2004). 
 35. See Siri Carpenter, Buried Prejudice, SCI. AM. MIND, Apr./May 2008, at 32– 33. 
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biases will lead to biased decision-making. Although no studies have yet 
tested whether implicit biases affect prosecutorial decisions, similar re-
search in nonlegal professions has shown that implicit biases predict im-
portant decisions in concerning ways. 
For example, medical researchers found that when asked to diag-
nose and treat a hypothetical patient (who was pictured as either black or 
white), emergency room doctors in Boston and Atlanta relied on their 
implicit racial biases.36 Doctors who showed more bias in the black–
white IATs were more likely to offer a preferred heart treatment to a 
white patient than a black patient.37 Similarly striking research emerged 
in Sweden where Dan-Olof Rooth replied to hundreds of job postings by 
submitting resumes that differed only in the ethnicity revealed by the 
applicant’s name.38 Rooth measured which resumes elicited invitations to 
interview and subsequently tracked down the individual human resources 
officers responsible for making the interviewing decisions. Without 
knowing the true purpose of the study, the human resources officers 
completed an IAT. The researcher was able to measure the relationship 
between the officers’ IAT scores and their previous decisions of whether 
to interview a candidate.39 He found that the greater the human resources 
officers’ implicit bias, the more likely those officers were to extend an 
interview to a non-Arab candidate. Other studies, including a meta-
analysis of over 100 IATs, confirm that implicit bias on the IAT indeed 
predicts the way people make decisions in the real world.40 
Few IATs have been conducted in the legal setting, but the ones 
that have tend to show that implicit racial biases are powerful and have 
broad effects.41 A study by Levinson, Young, and Huajian Cai, for ex-
                                                            
 36. Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombo-
lysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231 (2007). 
 37. Id. at 1235. Specifically, the doctors were asked to recommend a course of treatment for 
the patient and were then asked to complete three IATs testing their implicit racial biases. Id. at 
1233. The study showed that doctors not only implicitly preferred white patients to black patients but 
also that their implicit racial biases predicted whether or not they would recommend thrombolysis 
(clot busting) treatment to a white or black patient suffering from myocardial infarction. Id. at 1234–
35. The more the doctors implicitly preferred the white patients, the more likely they were to rec-
ommend thrombolysis treatment to white but not black patients. Id. at 1235. No similar predictive 
validity was found by asking doctors about their explicit racial preferences. Id. at 1233. On average, 
doctors self-reported no racial preferences at all. Id. 
 38. Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence (Inst. for the 
Study of Labor, University of Kalmar, Discussion Paper No. 2764), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984432. 
 39. Id. at 9–11. 
 40. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. 
Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 32 (2009). 
 41. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death 
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1542 (2004) (finding implicit racial bias among capital 
defense attorneys); Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblind-
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ample, tested implicit associations relating to the presumption of inno-
cence and found that people hold implicit associations between black and 
guilty.42 Using an IAT created specifically to examine the implicit con-
nections of the presumption of innocence, as well as a traditional IAT 
measuring implicit racial attitudes, the researchers also showed that IAT 
scores predicted the way in which participants evaluated ambiguous trial 
evidence.43 
Considered together, over a decade of research on implicit racial bi-
as shows that racial stereotypes can be activated easily and can lead to 
powerful and biased decision-making. In the case of prosecutorial deci-
sion-making, there is significant reason to be concerned that implicit bi-
ases could similarly lead to discriminatory results. The next Part pursues 
this possibility by deconstructing prosecutorial decision-making and con-
sidering the various ways that implicit racial bias could challenge the 
integrity of the current prosecutorial system. 
III. IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS CAN OPERATE IN EVERY PHASE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
Prosecutors enjoy more unreviewable discretion than any other ac-
tor in the criminal justice system.44 In this Part, we analyze this vast dis-
cretion by first isolating its various component parts and then exploring 
how implicit racial bias can operate in each phase of prosecutorial discre-
tion.45 We focus on three primary areas: (1) charging decisions, including 
both the decision of whether to charge and the decision of what crime to 
charge; (2) pretrial strategy, such as the decisions to oppose bail, offer a 
plea bargain, or disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense; 
and (3) trial strategy, such as the decision to strike potential jurors or to 
analogize the defendant to an animal during closing arguments. 
                                                                                                                                     
ness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGIS. STUD. 886 (2010) (finding that implicit stereotypes about the ethnicity 
of successful litigators predicted judgments of litigator performance); Rachlinski et al., supra note 3, 
at 1195–96 (finding that judges possess implicit biases favoring whites over blacks, and these biases 
sometimes predicted a judge’s decisions). 
 42. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 3, at 206. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009). 
 45. For a discussion of the possible impact of implicit racial bias on other actors in the criminal 
justice system, see Charles Ogletree, Robert J. Smith & Johanna Wald, Criminal Law: Coloring 
Punishment: Implicit Social Cognition and Criminal Justice, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE 
LAW, supra note 2, at 45, 50–60. 
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A. Charging Decisions 
The first decision that a prosecutor makes in most criminal cases is 
whether to charge the suspect, and if so, with what charge.46 In some 
cases the decision involves whether to charge the suspect at all. This 
power is an expression of mercy—holding back the legitimate power of 
the State. But as the United States Supreme Court noted in McCleskey v. 
Kemp, “[T]he power to be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate.”47 
Empirical studies confirm that the Court’s observation has played out; 
prosecutors are less likely to charge white suspects than black suspects.48 
These findings are true even when statistically controlled for prior crimi-
nal record.49 Faced with such discrepancies in charging decisions, the 
question becomes: If two suspects with substantially similar backgrounds 
are arrested for identical crimes in the same jurisdiction, how can the 
suspect’s race possibly matter? One possibility is that implicit bias is at 
play. 
1. Charge or Release? 
In order to understand the role that implicit racial bias might play in 
a decision of whether to charge a suspect with a crime, consider an am-
biguous case of self-defense.50 Imagine two homicide cases with identi-
                                                            
 46. In federal cases, and in a minority of states, the prosecutor’s charging decision must be 
approved by a grand jury. This process, however, usually consists of little more than “rubber stamp-
ing” prosecutorial charging decisions. See Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and 
the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 
474 (1980) (indicating that grand juries rarely serve as a check against the charging decisions of 
prosecutors). 
 47. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (internal citation omitted); see also Angela 
J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 
35 (1998) (“A prosecutor may unconsciously consider a case involving a white victim as more seri-
ous than a case involving a black victim. This unconscious view may influence not only the charging 
decision, but related decisions as well.” (internal citations omitted)); Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing 
Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 475 (2009) (“In the Jena Six case it 
can be argued that the prosecutor is capable of compassion in that he chose not to prosecute the 
white students who placed nooses on the schoolyard tree.”). 
 48. Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report on Race and Wash-
ington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 647 (2012) [hereinafter Task Force 
Report] (“[E]ven after legally relevant factors . . . are taken into account,” racial differences affect 
how cases are processed: whites are less likely to have charges filed against them. (citing Robert D. 
Crutchfield, Ethnicity, Labor Markets, and Crime, in ETHNICITY, RACE, AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES 
ACROSS TIME AND SPACE (Darnell Hawkins ed., 1995))). Similarly, prosecutors have been shown to 
charge white and black defendants differently in homicide cases. See Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. 
Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 587, 587 
(1985) (finding that the race of the defendant and victim mattered in charging decisions in Florida). 
 49. Radelet & Pierce, supra note 48, at 591. 
 50. This phenomenon is not limited to the self-defense context. For one particularly powerful 
example, consider the following story from a former United States Attorney: 
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cal facts except the race of the victim: one is black and the other is white. 
The suspect in each case claims self-defense, specifically alleging that he 
accidently bumped into the deceased outside of a bar at night, at which 
point the deceased warned, “You better watch yourself, or you’re going 
to get yours.” The suspect contends that the deceased then reached to-
ward his waist and began to pull out a shiny object. The suspect, thinking 
the deceased was reaching for a weapon, fired his own handgun in what 
turned out to be a fatal shot. No gun was located near the victim’s body, 
but police found a silver cell phone several feet from the deceased. 
Prosecutors must assess the strength of a potential self-defense 
claim to determine whether they should bring charges at all, and if so, 
whether to offer a plea to manslaughter or another less serious charge. 
Assessing the strength of a possible self-defense claim requires an in-
stinctual judgment: did the suspect reasonably believe that the deceased 
was reaching for a weapon? Recall our discussion of research indicating 
that Americans implicitly associate black citizens with aggression and 
hostility. Additional empirical research shows that people specifically 
associate blacks with guns and other weapons. For example, thousands of 
IATs taken online over the years have confirmed that the vast majority of 
Americans implicitly associate blacks with weapons and whites with 
harmless objects.51 Other studies using priming methodology support this 
finding. Keith Payne, for example, found that when participants viewed 
rapidly flashing photos of black faces immediately before seeing photos 
of guns, they were significantly faster at identifying the guns than after 
being primed by white faces.52 Applying this research to the scenario 
                                                                                                                                     
I had an [Assistant U.S. Attorney who] wanted to drop the gun charge against the defend-
ant [in a case in which] there were no extenuating circumstances. I asked, “Why do you 
want to drop the gun offense?” and he said, “He is a rural guy who grew up on a farm. 
The gun he had with him was a rifle. He is a good ol’ boy, and all the good ol’ boys have 
rifles, and it’s not like he was a gun-toting drug dealer.” But he [was] a gun-toting drug 
dealer, exactly. 
JAMES E. JOHNSON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL 
PROSECUTIONS 11 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/ProsecutorialDiscretion_ 
report.pdf?nocdn=1. 
 51. Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 
18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36, 55 (2007). We do not intend to suggest that implicit racial biases 
operate to the detriment of only black minorities. We focus on black Americans primarily, however, 
because research from the implicit bias literature is most robust in this area. We hope this work will 
be expanded to include a better understanding of the effects of implicit biases on all negatively ste-
reotyped groups. 
 52. B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Process-
es in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185–86 (2001). Similarly, 
when participants saw photos of white faces immediately before photos of tools, they were signifi-
cantly faster at identifying the tools. Id. at 185. Interested in similar real-world applications of im-
plicit bias and the association with weapons found by other researchers, Joshua Correll created a 
videogame-like study designed to test a phenomenon called, “Shooter Bias.” Joshua Correll et al., 
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above, one could predict that a person perceived to be hostile and implic-
itly associated with weapons—a black person—would be perceived by 
prosecutors as likely reaching for a weapon. 
The research, especially IAT findings that people implicitly disso-
ciate whites and weapons, also suggests that prosecutors might be more 
likely to believe that the white victim was reaching for his cell phone, 
and thus, that the suspect acted unreasonably in shooting the deceased. 
So, switch the facts and assume that both victims are white. If suspect 
one is black, because Americans associate black citizens with hostility 
and aggression, then the prosecutor might be inclined to believe that the 
black suspect acted too quickly in shooting the unarmed man, while the 
same prosecutor might be inclined to believe that the white suspect—not 
only unencumbered by these negative associations but also bolstered by 
positive stereotypes such as lawful, trustworthy, and successful53—acted 
reasonably in discharging his weapon. Of course, these dynamics would 
be amplified in a cross-racial shooting because stereotypes affect the 
evaluation of both the suspect’s and the victim’s behavior. A white vic-
tim would be more likely to be perceived as reaching for a cell phone, 
and a black victim would be more likely to be perceived as reacting un-
reasonably in discharging his weapon. 
Implicit racial bias might also affect prosecutorial discretion in the 
charging decision in a non-self-defense scenario. Consider a case in 
which the prosecutor must decide whether to charge a suspect with forci-
ble rape. According to the suspect, after a romantic dinner and a movie, 
the complaining witness invited him back to her house. They entered her 
bedroom. The complaining witness grabbed his crotch area and started 
kissing him. He directed her onto the bed and began taking off her (and 
                                                                                                                                     
The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individu-
als, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1314–15, 1322 (2002) [hereinafter Correll et al., 
Police Officer’s Dilemma]. The “game” displays a series of photos of white and black suspects and 
pairs each individual suspect with either a gun or an innocuous object (such as a cell phone). Id. at 
1315. Study participants play the game by looking at the suspects as they appear on the screen and 
then determining (as fast as possible), based upon whether the suspects are holding a gun or not, 
whether or not to shoot. Id. They are instructed to shoot armed suspects as fast as possible, and not 
shoot (by hitting a safety button) unarmed suspects as fast as possible. Id. at 1315–16. Similar to the 
IAT, the researcher in this study measures the participants’ reaction time in milliseconds as well as 
the number of errors they make in shooting or not shooting suspects. Id. at 1317. The results of the 
study consistently show that the vast majority of participants shoot armed black suspects faster than 
armed white suspects, and even more concerning, make errors in a systematic way by shooting more 
unarmed black suspects than unarmed white suspects. Id. at 1318; see also Joshua Correll et al., 
Event-Related Potentials and The Decision to Shoot: The Role of Threat Perception and Cognitive 
Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 120, 122 (2006) (finding that shooter bias is 
related to the activation of fear in participants’ brains). 
 53. These are words that are often used in a black–white stereotype IAT. See Rudman & Ash-
more, supra note 29, at 361. 
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then his) clothes and began having intercourse. After roughly one mi-
nute, she slapped his face. Taking this as a sign of sexual play, he 
slapped her back. After roughly another minute, he saw tears rolling 
down her face, immediately stopped having intercourse and asked her, 
“What’s wrong?” 
The witness tells a different story. She contends that the suspect 
closed the door after they entered the bedroom. He approached her 
quickly as though he was going to shove her against the door. She put up 
her hand in a defensive posture and struck him in the crotch area. He be-
gan kissing her. At first she tried to pull away, but then she “just sort of 
stopped resisting.” He shoved her onto the bed and began taking off her 
(and then his) clothes. She said it “all happened so quickly” that she 
didn’t know what was happening and felt like she was in “shock.” She 
slapped his face as hard as she could muster. He then slapped her across 
the face with such force that she thought “my jaw had shattered.” She 
began to sob. After a pause, he asked her, “What is wrong?” and then 
rolled off from on top of her. She began to sob very loudly. How does 
the prosecutor evaluate whether to charge this crime as a rape or consider 
the conduct to represent a reasonable mistake? 
As prosecutors process the contested facts of the case, they cannot 
help but consider both the rape suspect and the complaining witness. Re-
garding the race of the suspect, research confirms that people associate 
the crime of rape with black perpetrators. A study by Jeanine Skorinko 
and Barbara Spellman found that when asked to identify societal concep-
tions of criminals for certain crimes, participants overwhelmingly select-
ed black perpetrators as being associated with the crime of rape.54 After 
reading the competing statements of the suspect and the complaining 
witness, and seeing the mug shot of the suspect, a black male, prosecu-
tors might implicitly associate black male with sexual aggression and 
insatiability, and even, as the research suggests, specifically with the 
crime of rape.55 It is not that the prosecutors consciously think about the 
black suspect and purposefully decide that black males are rapists. Ra-
ther, the associations are automatic; the prosecutors might “sense” ag-
gression in the interaction or might have an instinctual reaction that the 
suspect is an incorrigible offender, but those thoughts are not necessarily 
                                                            
 54. Jeanine L. Skorinko & Barbara A. Spellman, Speech at the 1st Annual Conference on 
Empirical Legal Studies: Stereotypic Crimes: How Group-Crime Associations Affect Memory and 
(Sometimes) Verdicts and Sentencing 19 (Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=917761. 
 55. See Susan Hanley Kosse, Race, Riches & Reporters—Do Race and Class Impact Media 
Rape Narratives? An Analysis of the Duke Lacrosse Case, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243, 251 (2007) (“Re-
search shows black males have been characterized traditionally as hypersexual, ‘lascivious, sexual 
monsters who preyed upon white women.’” (citation omitted)). 
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consciously linked to race. And, again, it matters who the complaining 
witness is too. White women historically have been portrayed as pure 
and sexually modest. Black women, by contrast, are stereotyped as pro-
miscuous and seductive.56 If the complainant in a rape case is a black 
woman, the prosecutor might implicitly associate the victim with such 
stereotypes and unintentionally devalue the accusation. 
2. Determining What Crime to Charge 
In other cases, the question is what crime to charge. The American 
Bar Association’s Standards for the Prosecutorial Function lists the fol-
lowing factors among those for the prosecutor to consider in making the 
charging decision: What motives did the accused possess? Is the offense 
proportionate to the potential punishment? What is “the extent of the 
harm caused by the offense”?57 Each of these guideposts requires highly 
subjective decision-making. Evidentiary assessments in these contexts 
are not as simple as determining whether a gun was fired. Consider a 
scenario in which a prosecutor must choose between charging a suspect 
with simple drug possession or possession with intent to distribute. Imag-
ine two suspects are arrested, both possessing the same quantity of 
drugs—one suspect is black, one is white. Stereotypes related to drug 
using versus drug dealing become relevant, and any implicit associations 
that prosecutors might have regarding race and the particular crimes can 
affect the charge rendered. If we assume that prosecutors hold similar 
stereotypes as the rest of us (and there is little reason to believe other-
wise)58 then it becomes clear how when a prosecutor sees a young black 
male with drugs, the association between young black male and drug 
dealer59 can affect the evaluation of whether this particular person in-
tended to sell the drugs or to consume them for personal use.60 
                                                            
 56. Id. (“[B]lack female rape victims are either ignored by the media altogether or portrayed as 
‘loose, promiscuous, oversexed, whorish women.’” (citation omitted)). 
 57. A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS: PROSECUTION FUNCTION §§ 3-3.9(b)(iv), 
(iii), (ii) (1992), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_ar 
chive/crimjust_standards_pfunc_blk.html. 
 58. See, e.g., JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 50; Levinson et al., Social Science Overview, supra 
note 27, at 9–12. 
 59. Sara Steen et al., Images of Danger and Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case Processing, 
and Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 435, 446 (2005) (noting that the stereotypical represen-
tation of a dangerous drug dealer overlaps with the stereotypical characteristics of black Americans). 
 60. Supporting this argument, there is evidence of significant gaps between actual drug dealing 
rates and the arrest rates from drug dealing. See Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: 
Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 121 (2008) (examining 
statistics from Seattle, Washington, and finding that although the majority of drug dealers were 
found to be white, 64% of drug dealing arrestees were black). 
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Another charging decision that illustrates how implicit racial bias 
might infect prosecutorial decision-making involves the decision to 
charge juvenile suspects (those under the age of eighteen) in adult court 
as opposed to juvenile court. The differences between juvenile and adult 
proceedings are drastic. Although the goal of adult court is to punish the 
offender, the goal of juvenile court centers on the well-being of the juve-
nile delinquent. 61  Moreover, while in most jurisdictions a juvenile 
charged with a serious offense in juvenile court faces detention until his 
twenty-first birthday (or five years after the commission of the crime, 
whichever is longer),62 the same juvenile charged in adult court could 
face decades of (or, in the most serious cases, life) imprisonment. 
Several criteria guide the decision to transfer a juvenile into adult 
court, including: “The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as de-
termined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emo-
tional attitude and pattern of living”;63 “[t]he seriousness of the alleged 
offense”;64 “[w]hether the alleged offense was committed in an aggres-
sive, violent, premeditated or willful manner”;65 and “[t]he prospects for 
adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable reha-
bilitation of the juvenile.”66 In order to get a sense of the various ways in 
which implicit racial bias can operate in the decision to transfer a juve-
nile to adult court, once again consider the stereotype that black Ameri-
cans are more aggressive and hostile than their white counterparts. When 
prosecutors assess “the seriousness of the alleged offense” or whether the 
offense was committed in an “aggressive or violent” manner, they assess 
the facts not in a vacuum but in relation to the offender. Similarly, when 
prosecutors evaluate the juvenile’s “home, environmental situation, emo-
tional attitude and pattern of living,” stereotypes of Latino families living 
in crowded and squalid conditions may affect the prosecutors’ judg-
ments. Thus, given the broad discretion of prosecutors and the close con-
nection between the legal standards and racial and ethnic stereotypes, it 
is likely that two identical charges can end up in different courts (juve-
nile versus adult) despite substantially similar facts. 
                                                            
 61. Administrative Office of the Courts of Georgia, Juvenile Courts, GEORGIACOURTS.GOV, 
http://www.georgiacourts.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=169&Itemid=0 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2012) (“The purpose of our Juvenile Courts is to protect the well-being of chil-
dren, provide guidance and control conducive to child welfare and the best interests of the state, and 
secure care for children removed from their homes.”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 app. at 566–67 (1966) (listing factors to be considered 
in deciding whether to transfer a case to adult court). 
 64. Id. app. at 566. 
 65. Id. app. at 567. 
 66. Id. 
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Imagine a sixteen-year-old youth who steals a candy bar from a 
convenience store, the store clerk struggles to restrain the juvenile before 
he exits the store, and the juvenile punches the clerk in the face, render-
ing him unconscious. Did the juvenile strike the store clerk because it 
was the only way he could get free and avoid apprehension? Did the ju-
venile just panic? Or is the juvenile the type of person who will react 
violently at the drop of a dime? If the juvenile is black, the prosecutor 
assessing the facts of this case might be primed by the picture of the ju-
venile, the notation that he is black, or even the recognition of a stereo-
typically black name that triggers associations between the black juvenile 
and the concepts of aggression and hostility.67 The activation of these 
negative constructs can translate into a sense that the crime (or the of-
fender) is more aggressive or violent than would be the case if the prose-
cutor assessed the facts of the case in a truly race-neutral manner. This 
implicitly biased evaluation process has been documented in juvenile 
probation officers and police officer participants. Sandra Graham and 
Brian Lowery, for example, found that when these participants were sub-
liminally primed with words related to the category black, they judged an 
adolescent’s behavior as more dispositional, of greater culpability, and 
more likely to lead to recidivism.68 
Consistent with these startling results, research from the field sug-
gests that decision-makers in fact possess the perception that misbehav-
ior by black youth is more dispositional than misbehavior by white 
youth. Analyzing official court assessments of juvenile offenders, 
George Bridges and Sara Steen found that officials “consistently portray 
black youths differently than white youths in their written court reports, 
more frequently attributing blacks’ delinquency to negative attitudinal 
and personality traits.”69 Just as in Graham and Lowery’s study, the re-
searchers found that perceived “negative internal attributes” that the 
black children possessed outweighed even characteristics such as the se-
riousness of the offense and prior criminality.70 
The operation of implicit racial bias on the charging decisions of 
prosecutors can even mean the difference between life and death. For 
                                                            
 67. In addition to the stereotypes that apply to black citizens, and especially black males, there 
is some evidence of powerful stereotypes that apply uniquely to black youth. See, e.g., Rashmi Goel, 
Delinquent or Distracted? Attention Deficit Disorder and the Construction of the Juvenile Offender, 
27 LAW & INEQUALITY 1, 39 (2009) (referencing “the stereotype of the ‘big Black kid’ as bestial, 
uncontrollable, and aggressive” (citation omitted)). 
 68. Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Ado-
lescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 483 (2004). 
 69. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile 
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 567 (1998). 
 70. Id. 
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offenses eligible for capital punishment, the decision to prosecute also 
includes whether to seek the death penalty. If prosecutors decide to pros-
ecute for capital punishment, they need to choose which aggravating fac-
tor(s) (those elements which elevate ordinary first-degree murder to a 
murder that is eligible for a possible death sentence) to allege.71 For ex-
ample, prosecutors could assert that this particular murderer deserved the 
death penalty relative to the average murderer because he is a “future 
danger” to society.72 All murderers have, by definition, purposefully tak-
en a human life. But how do prosecutors decide which murderers are 
among the most likely murderers to represent a future danger to society? 
The decision requires prosecutors to make a highly subjective predictive 
determination and thus a determination prone to bias. When prosecutors 
evaluate the capitally accused suspect, whom do they see? As we have 
explained, the mere activation of a racial stereotype has been shown to 
lead to harsher attributions of criminal disposition and hostility, even in 
ambiguous situations. In the case of a black defendant, particularly one 
who possesses more Afrocentric features, these same negative stereo-
types of a hostile black defendant could, in turn, influence whether the 
prosecutor views the defendant as a future danger.73 
Thus, whether the charging decision involves the prosecution of a 
forcible rape case, the decision to charge a drug crime as either simple 
possession or possession with the intent to distribute, or even whether to 
seek the death penalty against a particular defendant, the discretion en-
closed in each of these moments of prosecutorial decision-making per-
mits the operation of implicit racial bias in the criminal justice system. 
B. Pretrial Strategy 
1. Bail Determinations 
Once a charging decision has been made, prosecutors must deter-
mine whether to oppose bail and, if not, how high of a bail to recom-
                                                            
 71. For a fuller exploration of this phenomenon, see Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Capital 
Punishment: Choosing Life or Death (Implicitly), in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra 
note 2, at 229, 231–43. 
 72. See, e.g., Buck v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 32, 35–36 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (“[T]he [Texas] prosecutor [in a capital murder case] said: ‘you have determined 
that . . . the race factor, black, increases the future dangerousness [of the defendant] . . . . [The ex-
pert] answered, ‘yes.’”). 
 73. Indeed, research shows that there is a relationship between death sentences and the stereo-
typically black appearance of defendants. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: 
Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 383, 385 (2006). Other research confirms the effect of stereotypically black appearances in 
criminal decision-making. See Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in 
Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 674 (2004). 
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mend. There is empirical evidence to suggest that, at least in some juris-
dictions, minority defendants receive less favorable pretrial detention 
determinations than their white counterparts.74 Similar to a prosecutor’s 
decision to charge, this finding might be partially driven by implicit ra-
cial attitudes and stereotypes. In the bail context, in addition to the stere-
otype of the black defendant as hostile and prone to criminality,75 which 
itself could lead to inflated bail requests, implicit racial bias might also 
operate through a functionally distinct mechanism—namely, the implicit 
devaluation of the defendant. One major factor in all bail determinations 
is the strength of the defendant’s ties to the community, including em-
ployment situation. Here, the assumption is that if a defendant has a good 
job and a solid connection with the community, then the defendant will 
be less likely to flee. 
As studies such as stereotype IATs repeatedly demonstrate, black 
Americans are stereotyped as being less intelligent, lazier, and less trust-
worthy than white Americans.76 If a prosecutor is primed with a picture 
of the black defendant as she reviews the case file prior to the bail hear-
ing, these negative work- and character-related stereotypes might cause 
the prosecutor to view the black defendant’s work history and communi-
ty connection with more skepticism than a similar background provided 
by a white defendant’s background.77 On the other hand, a white prose-
cutor might view a similarly situated white defendant with positive im-
plicit attitudes and stereotypes activated. These stereotypes might lead to 
the judgment that a hard-working and intelligent white defendant has a 
                                                            
 74. Task Force Report, supra note 48, at 628 (“Disparate treatment has been discovered in the 
context of pretrial release decisions, which systematically disfavor minority defendants.”); see also 
Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 987, 987 (1994) (finding that black and male Hispanic defendants in New Haven, Connecticut 
appeared to be given bail at unjustifiably high amounts). 
 75. The pretrial bail context is analogous in many respects to posttrial sentencing, a topic that 
we do not discuss in depth in this Article. After a jury convicts the defendant, the prosecutor must 
decide what sentence to recommend to the trial judge. See Task Force Report, supra note 48, at 647. 
Here, too, there is evidence to suggest racially disparate outcomes. Id. In Washington State, for 
example, black defendants in felony drug cases are roughly two-thirds more likely than comparable 
white defendants to receive a prison sentence. Id. at 648. The role of implicit racial bias on the oper-
ation of prosecutorial discretion might inform these disparities too. Studies suggest that prosecutors 
recommend harsher sentences for black defendants. Id. at 647. The implicit connection between 
black citizens and hostility, dangerousness, and criminality can operate in the sentencing recommen-
dation context just as it operates to influence the amount of bail the prosecutor recommends for a 
suspect pretrial. See id. at 650. 
 76. See, e.g., Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 29, at 361. 
 77. Of course, in some circumstances, this employment-related stereotype, as well as others, 
might reflect reality. For example, there is evidence that black Americans are disproportionately 
poor and have lower employment rates. There is, however, evidence that implicit bias can lead to 
such results. See, e.g., Rooth, supra note 38. 
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strong employment background and an intimate connection with the 
community. 
2. Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
prosecutors to disclose to the defense any exculpatory information they 
uncover.78 But the evidence does not always make its way into the de-
fense counsel’s hands. Sometimes this is because prosecutors willfully 
refuse to turn over the evidence despite its exculpatory nature. Take the 
case of Connick v. Thompson.79 John Thompson spent eighteen years in 
the Louisiana State Penitentiary—most of them on death row—before 
his release in 2003.80 At his capital murder trial, Thompson opted not to 
testify in his own defense because he was previously convicted of armed 
robbery.81 The proof of his innocence of the armed robbery languished in 
the files of the New Orleans Crime Laboratory.82 One month before his 
scheduled execution, a defense investigator stumbled upon a lab report 
indicating that the blood evidence the prosecution presented at trial did 
not match Thompson’s blood type.83 One assistant district attorney “in-
tentionally suppressed [the] blood evidence,” and then, shortly after be-
ing diagnosed with terminal cancer, confessed his wrongdoing to another 
assistant district attorney who did not reveal the secret until five years 
later.84 The Louisiana Supreme Court vacated both convictions.85 Upon 
his release, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney retried Thompson for 
capital murder. A jury acquitted him. 
Why would prosecutors choose to not turn over exculpatory evi-
dence? One possibility is that they are convinced that the defendant 
committed the crime despite the potentially exculpatory evidence, and 
they believe that the evidence would unduly harm the chance to convict a 
dangerous offender. Under this theory, whether to disclose potentially 
                                                            
 78. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (holding that prosecutors must turn over to 
the defense evidence “clearly supportive of a claim of innocence” regardless of whether the defense 
requests the evidence); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution”). 
 79. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355 (2011). This description of the Connick case 
first appeared in Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protections, WASH. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
 80. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1356 n.1. 
 85. Id. at 1355. 
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exculpatory evidence turns, in part, on the seriousness of the charges and 
the perceived strength of the defense case as discounted for revelation of 
the piece of evidence to the defense. Perceptions of the seriousness of the 
crime, in turn, depend in significant part on the how the prosecutor views 
the defendant. If the defendant is implicitly associated with hostility, 
criminality, or dangerousness, then implicit racial bias can influence the 
decision to disclose (or not) the ambiguous evidence by altering the per-
ception of the defendant, which, in turn, alters the perception of the seri-
ousness of the crime. Thus, prosecutors’ decisions to comply with their 
Brady obligations also can be infected by implicit racial bias. 
3. Plea-Bargaining 
Most criminal cases are resolved by plea bargain, where the de-
fendant admits guilt in exchange for a reduced charge (or a lesser sen-
tencing recommendation). Unlike the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, 
plea-bargaining is subject to almost zero oversight. We have argued that, 
in several contexts, implicit racial bias thrives in the midst of discretion-
ary determinations. Plea-bargaining is no exception. Consider a sampling 
of four “factors” among those the Department of Justice instructs federal 
prosecutors to consult in deciding whether to pursue a bargained disposi-
tion: (1) “[T]he nature and seriousness of the offense or offenses 
charged”; (2) “the defendant’s remorse or contrition and his willingness 
to assume responsibility”; (3) “the public interest in having the case tried 
rather than disposed of by a guilty plea”; and (4) “the expense of trial and 
appeal.”86 How might the defendant’s (or the victim’s) race have an im-
pact on the prosecutor’s decision whether to offer a plea bargain, and if a 
plea is in fact offered, how much of a charging reduction will be offered 
in exchange for the guilty plea? 
First, consider prosecutors’ assessment of the “seriousness of the 
offense charged.” Imagine a domestic violence case where a man severe-
ly abuses his spouse. Does it matter if the spouse is black?87 Imagine 
white prosecutors deciding whether to offer the suspect a plea deal on a 
misdemeanor battery charge. As the prosecutors attempt to quantify the 
seriousness of the offense, they might not be able to empathize with the 
fear and pain of a black woman as much as they could empathize with a 
white woman subjected to domestic abuse. This phenomenon is known 
as “in-group favoritism,” which is defined as “our tendency to favor the 
                                                            
 86. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GRAND JURY MANUAL: PLEA AGREEMENTS IX-7 to -8 (1991), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/207144.pdf (excerpted from Principles of 
Federal Prosecutions). 
 87. Similarly, does it matter if his spouse is a man? 
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groups we belong to.”88 Justice Scalia might use the term in-group favor-
itism to label the “undeniable reality” he described in his dissent in Pow-
ers v. Ohio “that all groups tend to have particular sympathies . . . toward 
their own group members.”89 
There is experimental support for the existence and power of in-
group favoritism, or bias, as it relates to empathizing with a victim. 
Alessio Avenanti used a method called transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) to measure corticospinal activity level in participants who viewed 
short video clips of a needle entering into the hand of either a light-
skinned or dark-skinned person.90 Consistent with the in-group empathet-
ic-bias explanation, Avenanti found that region-specific brain activity 
levels were higher when Caucasian-Italian participants viewed the clip of 
a light-skinned participant experiencing pain than when they saw a clip 
of a dark-skinned target being subjected to pain.91 Returning to the white 
prosecutors trying to assess the seriousness of the domestic abuse suf-
fered by a black woman, prosecutors might undervalue the extent of the 
harm caused by the abuse relative to the harm that they would consider a 
similarly situated white woman—perhaps someone who reminds them of 
their mothers, sisters, or daughters—to have suffered. 
The defendant’s race (as well as the victim’s race) can also influ-
ence the plea-bargaining process. Imagine a prosecutor trying to deter-
mine whether to offer a defendant a plea to manslaughter (and thus a 
term of years) or to proceed to trial to try to obtain a second-degree mur-
der conviction (and thus, in many jurisdictions, life without parole). 
Whether “the public interest” is satisfied by a plea bargain (as opposed to 
going to trial where the defendant could receive a harsher sentence) and 
whether “the expense of trial” is worth it turn on how the prosecutor 
views the defendant. Is this person dangerous and thus likely to commit a 
future crime? As a white prosecutor reviews the case file of a young 
white defendant, the prosecutor might be unknowingly affected by posi-
tive implicit stereotypes relating to lawfulness and trustworthiness. This 
could lead to a more lenient evaluation of the defendant—troubled, but 
                                                            
 88. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 465, 476 (2010). 
 89. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 424 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 90. Alessio Avenanti, Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor Resonance with Other-
Race Pain, 20 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1018, 1020–21 (2010). Interestingly, both groups showed activity 
levels indicating empathy when viewing needles entering nonfamiliar purple hands. Id. The re-
searchers interpret this result as indicating that empathy was not simply inhibited by unfamiliarity 
but also by racial bias and stereotypes. Id. 
 91. Similarly, African-Italian participants showed more empathy-consistent brain activity lev-
els when viewing a dark-skinned person experiencing pain than when viewing a light-skinned person 
experiencing pain. Id. Results also showed that participants’ empathic response was predicted by 
their implicit racial biases. Id. 
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not a bad person, for example—and thus a plea offer is more likely to 
follow. As we have well-covered by now, the opposite will be true when 
the prosecutor views a black defendant; the prosecutor’s mind will likely 
trigger automatic associations between the defendant and the concepts of 
violence and hostility. On a related point, as the prosecutor attempts to 
determine the degree of remorse the defendant has displayed (for exam-
ple, during plea negotiations), the stereotype that black citizens are less 
fully human might render the prosecutor less able to detect remorse from 
a defendant’s body language or more likely to reject a black defendant’s 
apology as self-serving or otherwise not genuine.92 So too might the ste-
reotypes that black citizens are violent, hostile, and prone to criminality 
have an impact on the degree of remorse that the prosecutor is able to 
detect in a defendant. 
C. Trial Strategy 
1. Jury Selection 
Lawyers selecting a jury in a criminal case are allocated a prede-
fined number of peremptory challenges, which they can use to eliminate 
prospective jurors without justification. Under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, these strikes cannot be used to eliminate 
jurors based on their race.93 The prohibition against race-based strikes is 
clear, but policing the rule is far murkier. Courts routinely uphold per-
emptory challenges based on largely unverifiable race-neutral explana-
tions, for example, those based on avoiding eye contact, possessing an 
apparent lack of intelligence, or showing signs of nervousness. Indeed, it 
is so difficult to detect conscious evasion of the prohibition against ra-
cially motivated strikes that Justice Powell noted in Batson, 
“[P]eremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 
‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’”94 
Striking black jurors used to be based on explicit racism. For in-
stance, in Miller-el v. Cockrell, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed a trial 
manual (titled Jury Selection in a Criminal Case) used in the Dallas 
County District Attorney’s Office in the 1960s and 70s.95 Among the 
advice offered by the manual to trial prosecutors: “Do not take Jews, Ne-
groes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury, no 
                                                            
 92. See Philip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumaniza-
tion, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 304–05 (2008). 
 93. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986). 
 94. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). 
 95. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003). 
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matter how rich or how well educated.”96 Even in the twenty-first centu-
ry, prosecutors struggled to mask racially motivated strikes. For example, 
in one Louisiana capital case, the prosecutor explained that he struck one 
black juror because he was “the only single black male on the panel with 
no children.”97 There is less reason to believe that the vast majority of 
prosecutors today strive to strike jurors on the basis of race. This does 
not mean that race-based strikes are not a problem. Indeed, Justice 
Breyer recently noted that “[he] was not surprised to find studies and 
anecdotal reports suggesting that, despite Batson, the discriminatory use 
of peremptory challenges remains a problem.”98 
Implicit racial bias might help to explain why egalitarian-minded 
prosecutors nonetheless disproportionately strike black jurors.99 In addi-
tion to the stereotype that black citizens are prone to criminality (and 
thus might sympathize more with those who commit crime), prosecutors 
might associate black citizens with lack of respect for law enforcement 
and opposition to the prosecution of drug crimes or use of the death pen-
alty as a punishment.100 If a prosecutor questions a prospective black ju-
ror, the simple act of even talking to that person might activate any of 
these negative stereotypes as well as more general negative implicit atti-
tudes, causing the prosecutor to think or feel negative thoughts about the 
juror. The prosecutor might project this negativity through body lan-
guage and gestures, which could, in turn, cause jurors to avoid eye con-
tact, provide awkward or forced answers that make the juror appear less 
intelligent, or simply fidget and look nervous. Thus, even accurate race-
neutral behavior descriptions might stem from racialized assessments 
(albeit, without conscious thought) of the characteristics of individual 
jurors. 
2. Closing Arguments 
Implicit racial bias can also have an impact on the content of a 
prosecutor’s closing argument and, in turn, on the manner in which the 
jury (or judge) views the evidence in the case. In Darden v. Wainwright, 
the prosecution referred to the defendant during closing arguments as an 
“animal”101 that “shouldn’t be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him 
                                                            
 96. Id. (citation omitted). 
 97. State v. Harris, 820 So. 2d 471, 474 (La. 2002). 
 98. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 268 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 99. Antony Page has elegantly made this argument. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: 
Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005). 
 100. Of course (and, in some cases, for good reason) these last two stereotypes, which likely 
derive from a more general mistrust in the criminal justice system, might be accurate. 
 101. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180 n.11 (1986). 
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and a prison guard at the other end of that leash.”102 “In a recent Louisi-
ana case, the prosecution referred to the black . . . defendant as 
‘[a]nimals like that (indicating)’ and implored the jury to ‘be a voice for 
the people of this Parish’ and to ‘send a message to that jungle.’”103 The 
use of animal imagery in reference to the accused can both depend on 
and perpetuate the negative effects of implicit race bias. 
Referring to the accused in nonhuman terms dehumanizes the de-
fendant in the eyes of the jurors and could potentially lead to harsher 
punishment. In a compelling empirical study that showed how people 
continue to mentally link blacks with apes, Philip Goff and colleagues 
asked participants to view a degraded image of an ape that came into fo-
cus over a number of frames.104 When primed with a consciously unde-
tectable image of a black face, participants were able to identify the ape 
in fewer frames; conversely, when primed with a consciously undetecta-
ble white face, participants required more frames to detect the ape than 
when they received no prime at all.105 The study confirmed that people, 
most of who claimed not to have even heard of the stereotype linking 
blacks to apes, nonetheless implicitly associated blacks with apes, a find-
ing that heightens the concern surrounding the use of animal imagery 
during prosecution. 
In a related study that linked the animal-imagery study to criminal 
sentencing, Goff next explored the black–ape association by comparing 
the frequency of animalistic references to black defendants with that of 
similar references to white defendants in a dataset of 600 criminal cases 
prosecuted in Philadelphia between 1979 and 1999.106 The study found 
that coverage from the Inquirer, Philadelphia’s major daily newspaper, 
of black defendants included, on average, nearly four times the number 
of dehumanizing references per article than articles covering white capi-
tal defendants.107 Furthermore, the study found a strong correlation be-
tween the number of times an animalistic reference was made and the 
likelihood that the defendant received the most severe punishment avail-
able.108 
                                                            
 102. Id. at 180 n.12. 
 103. Robert J. Smith & Bidish J. Sarma, How and Why Race Continues to Influence the Admin-
istration of Criminal Justice in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 361, 403–04 (2012) (citing State v. Harris, 
820 So. 2d 471 (La. 2002) (transcripts containing the prosecutor’s references are on file with the 
Louisiana Supreme Court and the authors)). 
 104. See Goff et al., supra note 92, at 303–05. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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D. Beyond the Trial: More Prosecutorial Discretion 
This Part has provided a step-by-step account of the potential im-
pact that implicit racial bias can have on prosecutorial discretion. We 
have focused narrowly on case-specific decisions ranging from the deci-
sion to charge a suspect to how the prosecutor maneuvers through the 
pretrial process to the decisions the prosecutor makes at the trial. This 
discussion remains incomplete, however. The idea that easily activated 
stereotypes of certain defendants can influence the decision-making pro-
cess applies with equal force to other forms of prosecutorial discretion. 
For example, prosecutors must decide whether to join defense lawyers in 
urging for a conviction to be vacated in a case of actual innocence. Is a 
prosecutor convinced by a lower quantum of evidence in a case involv-
ing a white prisoner (who might or might not be a violent offender) than 
in a case involving a black or Latino prisoner? Perhaps the question is 
whether to recommend a defendant to drug counseling or to press instead 
for jail time—do implicit stereotypes of black citizens have an impact on 
the prosecutor’s assessment of the suitability of alternative sentencing?109 
Or consider office-wide decisions, such as on which crimes to con-
centrate prosecution efforts given limited resources.110 Is the decision to 
target street gangs—one recently made a top priority by the Department 
of Justice—influenced by the perceived explosion of Latino gangs and 
the conception of Latinos as drug dealers and “illegal aliens,” or is the 
decision based solely on the seriousness of the crime involved? Again, 
before we can answer that the seriousness of the crime drives the policy 
choice, are we able to gauge the seriousness of the crime without being 
influenced by our conception of the offenders? Indeed, the race of the 
defendant might infiltrate the prosecutor’s core beliefs about the justifi-
cations of punishment—do black defendants tend to activate the concep-
                                                            
 109. There is also emerging research suggesting that black citizens are viewed as possessing 
more static personality traits and thus as being less capable of change. This research would also be 
quite relevant to a prosecutor’s decision whether to recommend counseling or jail time for a black 
offender. See Jennifer Eberhardt, The Ape and the Static Being: Two Views of Blacks in the Modern 
Era, Panel at the Michigan State Law Review Symposium: Moving Beyond “Racial Blindsight”? 
The Influence of Social Science Evidence After the North Carolina Racial Justice Act (Apr. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.law.msu.edu/blindsight/media.html. 
 110. See Davis, supra note 47, at 36. 
[I]f a prosecutor deems a particular case to be more serious than others, she will tend to 
invest more time and resources in that case, both investigating and preparing for trial. 
Such an increased investment would consequently yield more evidence and stiffen prose-
cutorial resolve. The likelihood of conviction is also obviously increased by the addition-
al investment in investigation. Thus, although the strength of the evidence and the likeli-
hood of conviction are facially race-neutral factors, they may be influenced by an uncon-
sciously racist valuation of a case involving a white victim. 
Id. 
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tion that offenders deserve to be punished111 whereas white defendants 
tend to activate other justifications for punishment, such as deterrence or 
rehabilitation? 
We hope that we have conveyed a sense that the potential impact of 
implicit racial bias on prosecutorial discretion is broad and deep. In the 
remainder of this Article, we explore the ways in which we might build a 
body of proof to support our contention that implicit racial bias infects 
the decisions of prosecutors, and finally, we consider possible remedies 
for avoiding or minimizing the damage associated with the operation of 
such bias. 
IV. ADDRESSING THE EFFECTS OF IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ON 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
As we have demonstrated, there are compelling reasons to believe 
that prosecutors unwittingly display implicit racial bias at a variety of 
decision points. One could expect that in the aggregate, the harms of the-
se biases are quite substantial. It is important to note, however, that em-
pirical studies have yet to test prosecutors directly or prove that prosecu-
tors act automatically in bias-influenced ways. We therefore encourage 
researchers to take on the charge of pursuing our hypotheses empirically. 
Although we expect to pursue some of these hypotheses ourselves, the 
best science is collaborative, transparent, and forward-looking. We thus 
specifically encourage researchers to test precisely where and how im-
plicit bias operates in the context of prosecutorial decision-making and 
provide here several examples of potential starting points. 
For instance, testing our hypothesis regarding prosecutors’ deci-
sions whether or not to charge, researchers might examine whether par-
ticipants subliminally primed with black and white faces make different 
decisions when deciding how to charge suspects (versus opting not to 
prosecute) in borderline cases. A similar research methodology could be 
used to test our hypothesis regarding implicit bias and plea-bargaining. 
One could, for example, measure whether participants primed with a 
black face are less likely (than those primed with a white face) to rec-
ommend a plea deal to a lesser charge in the context of a particular 
crime, such as forcible rape, which plays into black stereotypes of sexual 
aggression. Using a different methodology relating to our hypothesis re-
garding the use of animal imagery in closing arguments, researchers 
                                                            
 111. See Goff et al., supra note 92, at 301–05. In one study, Goff and his colleagues had partic-
ipants watch a video of police officers beating a black suspect. Id. at 302. Video participants had 
previously been primed with either words relating to apes or big cats. Id. at 301–02. Participants 
primed with the ape words were more likely to report that the police beating was “deserved” and 
“justified” than those participants primed with the big cat words. Id. 
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could perform a coding analysis on actual closing arguments made by 
prosecutors, counting references to animal imagery, and could then seek 
to test those prosecutors using an implicit bias measure such as the IAT. 
If such a participant group could be located and tested (of course, with-
out knowing the exact purpose of the study), it might be possible to 
measure whether implicit bias levels predict prosecutors’ use of animal 
imagery in closing arguments. We believe studies such as these would 
help to pinpoint the exact locations where implicit bias is most likely to 
infect prosecutorial decision-making.112 
We also encourage researchers and policymakers to consider reme-
dial possibilities for the problem of implicit racial bias in prosecutorial 
discretion. The most obvious remedies, unfortunately, are the least likely 
to succeed. For instance, raising claims that prosecutors are selectively 
prosecuting black defendants is not a promising avenue. We know of no 
defendant who has obtained relief on these grounds in the modern era,113 
primarily because the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant 
must demonstrate that similarly situated suspects of other races were not 
subjected to prosecution in order to even gain discovery on such a 
claim.114 Nor are Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or Eighth Amend-
ment Cruel and Unusual Punishment claims destined to succeed. In 
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court rejected a capital defendant’s statistical 
offering that racial arbitrariness infected Georgia’s capital sentencing 
process and ruled that a defendant must show that racial bias infected his 
case before he might prevail on Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds.115 
Nor do we believe that implicit racial biases are subject to easy 
eradication. The associations that are triggered when people view a per-
son of a particular race are likely the product of extensive cultural and 
social learning.116 Some portion of our social learning is misinformed 
(e.g., “Black citizens are more hostile than white citizens.”). Some por-
                                                            
 112. Of course, these suggestions are only a few examples of a range of possible studies. 
 113. See Bibas, supra note 44, at 970 (noting in this context that “[n]o race-based claim has 
succeeded for more than a century”). 
 114. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996). 
 115. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). 
 116. Researchers have considered various social-learning-related factors that lead to implicit 
biases. See, e.g., Laurie A. Rudman, Sources of Implicit Attitudes, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 79, 79–81 (2004) (indicating that both early life experiences and culturally held bias-
es, as well as other factors, lead to implicit biases). Stereotypes more generally have been shown to 
be learned by extremely young children. See Page, supra note 99, at 203 (claiming to find that stere-
otypes arise when a person is as young as three years old and are usually learned from parents, peers, 
and the media); see also Frances E. Aboud & Maria Amato, Developmental and Socialization Influ-
ences on Intergroup Bias, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: INTERGROUP 
PROCESSES 65, 73–76 (Rupert Brown & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 2001). 
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tion, however, is perhaps accurate, though built on the foundations of 
structural inequality. Consider the stereotype that black citizens have less 
respect for law enforcement or trust in the judicial system. These stereo-
types accurately reflect most polling data and also reflect underlying re-
alities about police-citizen relations in minority-concentrated urban are-
as.117 In order to undo this cultural and social learning, we would need to 
see fundamental changes in the political, economic, and social structures 
that undergird our country.118 
But there are some promising shorter-term remedial avenues. 
Stephanos Bibas suggests that prosecution offices might collect and store 
comprehensive information on racial demographics at each stage of the 
charging process. The collected data would be made available internally 
and to a variety of external stakeholders, which would both allow for the 
review of “systemic patterns” and “create feedback loops and new met-
rics for prosecutorial success.”119 Prosecutors’ offices might also provide 
live or video trainings on implicit bias to attorneys and paralegals and 
could also include thoughtful discussions and explanations of implicit 
racial bias in training manuals that address each of the decision points 
where implicit racial bias is likely to infect the process. Although there is 
no guarantee that live or written trainings would necessarily reduce bias, 
those who are egalitarian-minded could use these explicit reminders to 
self-monitor.120 
Category-masking, the process of hiding racial demographic data 
until after the relevant decision is made, also holds some potential as a 
structural change that could reduce the effects of implicit bias. This pro-
cess has previously been proposed as a possible remedy for race-based 
                                                            
 117. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW 
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT xix (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_ 
report.pdf (“[C]ommunity members, especially members of racial, ethnic, and language minori-
ties . . . expressed to us their deep distrust of and sense of alienation from the police.”); Smith & 
Sarma, supra note 103, at 391 (“Part of the discrepancy stems from first-hand encounters with law 
enforcement that the black citizen interpreted to be racist, either explicitly (e.g., use of terms with 
racial meaning, such as ‘nigger’ or ‘boy’) or vicariously (e.g., being stopped for ‘driving while 
black.’)” (citation omitted)). 
 118. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 3, at 420 (noting that short-term 
remedies for implicit bias should not obscure the need for long-term cultural change). 
 119. Id. 
 120. This suggestion is analytically similar to the use of an implicit bias jury instruction for 
criminal trials. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selec-
tion: The Problems of Judge Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed 
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 149–51 (2010) (suggesting the use of implicit bias jury 
instructions and revealing that—as a federal district court judge—“I now include a slide about im-
plicit bias in the PowerPoint presentation that I show before allowing attorneys to question potential 
jurors”). 
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jury selection.121 In the jury selection context, litigants would exercise a 
first round of peremptory strikes based on answers to juror question-
naires that were scrubbed for demographic data. 
A similar effort undergirds the decision to proceed under the federal 
death penalty statute—when the prosecutor receives the case file they are 
(theoretically)122 unaware of the race of either the victim or the defend-
ant. Broadening this type of remedial effort beyond the situations of jury 
questionnaires and capital cases, one could imagine a process inside a 
district attorney’s office whereby a case intake coordinator masks all 
demographic information on a computerized case file (including the de-
fendant’s name and mug shot) until after the assistant district attorney 
handling the case has made a nonbinding charging decision (and prelimi-
nary plea bargain eligibility assessment).123 In addition, when office-wide 
data show significant disparities in charging or plea bargains in relation 
to a particular offense, any charging or bargaining decisions in those 
types of cases could be reviewed by a more senior prosecutor or a com-
mittee of prosecutors (with demographic data masked) regardless of the 
races involved. This process could continue until the office-wide data 
demonstrate that the disparity has been eliminated (or proven to be ac-
counted for by legitimate nonracial variables). 
Finally, we believe the hiring and promotion of a more diverse pool 
of assistant district attorneys might curb the operation of implicit racial 
bias and might even improve the quality of decision-making on an of-
fice-wide level. Research in the jury context, for example, has shown that 
diverse group decision-making is better than homogenous group deci-
sion-making.124 Furthermore, research in other areas, such as the educa-
tion arena, has found that students exposed to counter-stereotypical role 
models—for example, women engineering professors—actually harbored 
                                                            
 121. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race and Jury Selection: Psychologi-
cal Perspectives on the Peremptory Challenge Debate, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 527, 535 (2008) 
(“Research on orchestras, for example, demonstrates that female musicians are more likely to be 
hired when they audition behind a screen, effectively concealing their gender.” (citing Claudia 
Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female 
Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000))). 
 122. In reality, racial background is often easily predicted from other characteristics such as the 
name of the defendant or victim or the neighborhood where each resides. A truly colorblind process 
would exclude as much demographic data as possible without restricting the necessary case facts that 
the decision-maker must take into account. 
 123. Of course, true masking would require masking neighborhood demographics and even the 
names of the defendant and the victim, as these factors could easily “tip off” the prosecutor as to the 
racial background of the parties involved. 
 124. See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
597, 597 (2006) (comparing all white juries to mixed juries, and finding that mixed juries performed 
better). 
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reduced implicit bias.125 Based on these studies and others, we would 
expect that a diverse prosecutor’s office might not only facilitate an at-
mosphere with less implicit bias but could perhaps also lead to even 
more thoughtful and efficient decision-making. A related proposal that is 
both more aggressive and also more targeted to prosecutorial discretion 
would be to help assistant district attorneys better understand the minori-
ty group population that they serve (both the victims and the defendants) 
by encouraging these lawyers (perhaps with housing or tax incentives) to 
live in neighborhoods disproportionately impacted by the charging deci-
sions made by the district attorney’s office.126 
Each of the potential remedies we discuss above would benefit 
from empirical testing, yet we do not believe, considering the likely on-
going harms, that waiting for a perfect scientific answer to the debiasing 
question is the best response. It is true that there are no easy answers for 
remedying the influence of implicit racial bias on prosecutorial discre-
tion. Yet, justice should not wait, and the search for fairness in the crimi-
nal justice system must continue with both a moral compass and a thirst 
for emerging social-scientific knowledge. 
 
                                                            
 125. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing is Believing: Exposure to Counterstereotypic 
Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 642–45 (2004). 
 126. Of course, as one of the student editors who reviewed this piece noted, “Another sugges-
tion is to lessen the workload of prosecutors so that they have more time to fully analyze and devel-
op the facts of each case. Presumably, with more information and time spent analyzing what is going 
on, prosecutors will be more informed and rely less on their snap judgments or gut feelings.” 
